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Conflict of Laws--A Rationale
of Jurisdiction
By Roy MORtELAND*
Editor's Note: This article is the second in a series, the first being
published in 54 Ky. L.J. 5 (1965), concerning the subject of jurisdiction
in the area of Conflict of Laws. In this installment, the writer dis-
cusses domicile, nationality, appearance and consent as jurisdictional
factors. The third article in this series is now in the writing stage and
will appear in Volume 55 of the Kentucky Law Journal.
(2.) DoiciLE
Domicile may serve as a basis of jurisdiction,46 although there
are numerous objectionable features in its use. The Restate-
ment discusses "home" 47 as relating to domicile. Home is not a
basis of jurisdiction; there is no basis for its use in case law or in
text discussions. It may be doubted whether it is even a legal
word, although it has strong emotional connotations. The Re-
statement also discusses "residence" as relating to domicile.48
Residence is a legal word and it might well be urged that it should
serve as a basis of jurisdiction instead of domicile. If domicile
should continue as a basis then residence might be, or should be,
added as an additional basis, perhaps in place of presence. There
will be some consideration of residence in the subsequent dis-
cussion in this paper.
One objection to the use of domicile as a basis of jurisdiction
is its ambiguity. It is almost impossible to frame a definite and
satisfactory definition of the term. To say, as the Restatement
does, that one's domicile is "generally in the place where he has
his home,"49 is very misleading, if for no other reason than that it
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University Law
School.46Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 79 (1956).
47 Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 12, 13 (1954).
48 Id. at § 9, comment j.
49 Id. at § 9.
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is an over-simplification, not true in so many instances as to
make it very inaccurate and untrustworthy. In fact, if it were
realistically true there would be much less objection to the dom-
icile concept as a basis of jurisdiction. One is often more apt to
consider his residence as his home than his domicile. It is easy
to establish a domicile in Florida where one does not visit more
than once a year, if that often, while his home and residence and
presence remain in the North. Thus his Florida domicile is a
poor situs to serve as a basis of jurisdiction for service of process,
or as a place to defend a suit.
Various wordings may be suggested for an inclusive, accurate
definition of the word domicile. One of the better is that dom-
icile is where one has his legal residence with no present inten-
tion of changing it. Even that is defective for if he has a present
intention to change it but has not yet established a new domicile,
his old one is still in existence.50 One always has to have a dom-
icile someplace5l where he can be held responsible to receive his
"greetings" to serve in the armed services and to receive his tax
notices, if for no other reasons.
What is the definition of domicile? The writer has never found
a satisfactory one; the term is so unsettled and vague. It is true
that it may be an individual's "home" if his roots remain where
he was born or he has settled permanently in one place, where
he has his family and his work. But under modem conditions such
an individual has become almost the exception rather than the
rule. People move around and technical domicile may be a place
with which there is little actual contact or presence.
A reasonably inclusive definition of domicile might be "where
one has his home, or a fixed place other than his home, which
he has chosen as his official residence with no present intention
of changing it." Sometimes the phrase "legal residence"52 is used
as the equivalent of domicile and in many ways this is perhaps
the most inclusive and best description of the term. However,
while one must be present to establish a domicile, continued pres-
ence or residence is not necessary. 8 All these attempts at deft-
50 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) where the defendant had
left Texas with the intention of establishing a domicile elsewhere but his domicile
was still in Texas.51 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 11, comments a, b (1954).52 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 9, comment j (1954).
53 Id. at § 13, comment d, illustration 3.
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nition point up the various shadings of the term and its general
ambiguity. Perhaps this cannot be helped, but it results in a
concept of much uncertainty and too many meanings.
Aside from the unsatisfactory meaning of the term itself and
its uncertainty and ambiguity, two reasons have served to make
domicile a questionable and debatable basis of jurisdiction: a state
has jurisdiction although the domiciliary is absent from its ter-
ritory; and service reasonably calculated to reach the defendant is
sufficient, although it never reaches him in fact.
The rule that a state continues to have jurisdiction although a
domiciliary is absent from its territory is questionable under
many circumstances. The leading case on the proposition is
Milliken v. Meyer54 In that case the defendant was domiciled
in Wyoming but was temporarily present in Colorado, where he
was personally served in an action in personam instituted in
Wyoming, based upon a Wyoming statute allowing jurisdiction
over a Wyoming domiciliary outside the state if the defendant
was evading service within the state. He made no appearance in
the Wyoming cause and judgment was rendered against him.
There was no evidence that he was evading service in Wyoming.
He brought suit in Colorado alleging that the Wyoming court
had no jurisdiction over him, but the Supreme Court of the
United States ultimately held that the Wyoming court did have
jurisdiction based upon his domicile. There can be no objection
to service in the case as the defendant was personally served. The
issue of jurisdiction over one outside the state but domiciled
therein was thus squarely presented and squarely decided. The
case represents the law on its facts, although a question arises
in regard to the opinion's gratuitous dictum that service reason-
ably calculated to reach the out of state domiciliary 5 is due
process today, if the service does not reach him in fact.
This brings directly into the discussion the second reason for
questioning domicile as a basis of jurisdiction. Should service
reasonably calculated to reach the out of state domiciliary, but
which does not in fact do so, satisfy the requirements of due
process under the fourteenth amendment? Of course, if such
service does reach the defendant, there is no problem, as to
G4 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
55 Id. at 463.
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service, unless one wants to quibble about the technicalities of
some ambiguous phrase like "substituted service."
It is submitted that service which does not actually give notice
in such cases does not satisfy the qualities of "fair play" that the
Supreme Court constantly expounds. It cannot result in anything
other than a default judgment. Default judgments are always
somewhat unsatisfactory since they never are the result of a deci-
sion on the merits of the case. But a default judgment, occasioned
by the fact that the defendant did not know he was being sued,
is not only unsatisfactory, but it may be doubted that it has
enough redeeming features to offset the arguments against it.
The rule that service reasonably calculated to reach the de-
fendant is sufficient, is of ancient origin; it is old and established.
To say that the defendant is entitled to the best type of service
under the circumstances and that this type of service is only per-
missible when personal or actual service is impossible, is so un-
persuasive as to almost be "gibberish." The ethical issue is flatly:
"Is a service which does not reach the defendant in accord with
reasonable standards of fair play?" The answer would seem to
be an emphatic no. And the trend in professional literature and
current cases is decidedly in that direction.
Those who argue that service reasonably calculated to reach
should satisfy the requisites of due process invariably cite Mc-
Donald v. Mabee5 6 in support of their position. In that case
the defendant was out of the state of Texas, where he was dom-
iciled, seeking a domicile elsewhere, but not as yet having selected
one, when he was served in Texas in an action in personam. His
family remained in Texas; he was served by publication. It was
held that the service was insufficient. Justice Holmes said by way
of dictum that a service left with his family at his last place of
abode in Texas would perhaps have been sufficient. It is believed
that Holmes' dictum represents the law; furthermore, that it is
unobjectionable law as to service in the Mabee case since the
notice would be placed in the hands of his family at his last place
of abode, and so should surely reach him. Under the circum-
stances of that case service "reasonably calculated to reach" seems
satisfactory process but the phrase has been employed in other
cases where the rule reached a result far from satisfactory. This
56243 U.S. 90 (1917).
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is more proof that the phrase is an extremely dangerous one, re-
sulting in something less than fair play in so many cases that it
should be used but rarely.
The objection to the ambiquity of the word "domicile" itself
and to the policy of requiring an out of state domiciliary to stand
trial in the state where he is domiciled, plus the objection so often
found to something less than actual service in such cases causes
the suggestion that the time has come for a re-examination of
domicile as a basis of jurisdiction.
The domicile basis is an historical one, based largely upon
historical concepts of nationalism and duty to respond when the
"state" calls. In support of the rule it is often said that domicil-
iaries have lived within the state and have accepted its services
and protection. Special rights and privileges such as the right to
vote or hold office often depend upon domicile. In return for
these things it seems fair, it is said, to allow the state's courts to
have jurisdiction. 7 This smacks too much of ancient attitudes
of nationalism and feudalistic sovereignty. They are considered,
it is believed, somewhat spurious today, in defense of domicile.
At any rate, and more directly to the point, the plaintiff in the
action, and not the state, is the interested party and the one who
is benefited by the rule in most of these cases.
However, there are instances where the government is the
plaintiff in domicile cases and where the domicile rule still, today,
has benefit to the state. This class of cases brings to mind the sug-
gestion by Rosanna Blake5s that there is a relation between dom-
icile and nationality as bases of jurisdiction. For example, dom-
icile as well as nationality is seized upon as a jurisdictional factor
in tax cases. Taxes, like military service are somewhat an an-
omaly in the law. An excellent lawyer once said to this writer:
"A tax case is not authority for anything except another tax situ-
ation." The government does about as it pleases as to taxes and
military service as a matter of so-called expediency. In any event
taxes and military service are anomalies in the law, and perhaps
it is necessary that they remain so. On the other hand, it is be-
lieved that all such cases should rest on nationality,59 and on the
state level on citizenship, rather than domicile as a basis of juris-
W7 Note, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 724, 725 (1941).5 8 Note, 34 Ky. L.J. 139, 140 (1946).
U9 See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 248 U.S. 421 (1932).
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diction, with venue perhaps playing a part as to where the na-
tional (citizen) is served.
If all cases in which the government is the plaintiff were taken
out of the domicile category, there would still remain many situ-
ations where the plaintiff is a private person and the basis of
jurisdiction is domicile. For example, bona fide domicile is the
basis of jurisdiction for divorce, and there is no other, since
Williams v. North Carolina.60 This is unquestionably the current
law. Domicile determines the devolution of property if the owner
dies intestate. 61 There are many miscellaneous cases in which
domicile has served as the basis of jurisdiction in ordinary actions
in personam. Examples are McDonald v. Mabee and Milliken v.
Meyer, discussed supra in this paper.62
However, there are a number of state decisions holding that
domicile does not confer jurisdiction. 3 The leading case taking
the negative view is Raher v. Raher.64 That case is particularly
negative since there was actual service on the defendant outside
the state. The issue therefore rested squarely on jurisdiction over
one outside the state, but domiciled in the state.
In conclusion, the uncertainty in the meaning of the term
itself and the unsatisfactory results as it is applied in numerous
cases cause one to suggest that the time has come for a re-exam-
ination of domicile as a basis of jurisdiction. First, we must ex-
amine the soundness of the rule itself. The mere statement of
that phase of the rule that a domiciliary who is out of the state
can be forced to return to defend a local suit raises a certain
mental opposition. Of course, the local state is apt to be the most
convenient forum. The injury may have occurred there and it is
no farther for the defendant to return than it would be for the
plaintiff to go if he were asked to sue where the defendant ac-
tually is. Witnesses are apt to be in the local state. However,
that phase of the domicile rule that jurisdiction may be obtained
on an out of state (or even in state) domiciliary by service
60 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
61 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 102 (3d ed. 1949).
62 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S.
90 (1917). See also, Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 192, n.101 (3d ed. 1949).
68 See, Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 75, n.38 (3d. ed. 1963),
citing several cases.
64150 Iowa 511, 129 N.W. 494 (1911).
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reasonably calculated to reach him, but which does not,65 un-
doubtedly should be repudiated, since it is out of line with recent
trends and decisions as to fair play, and results in a default
judgment, which is not in accord with current conceptions of due
process.
It may well be argued that in cases where the government,
state or federal, is the plaintiff that nationality rather than dom-
icile serves better as a basis of jurisdiction. As Ehrenzweig points
out, there is a relationship between domicile and nationality and
in many situations the nationality (citizenship) principle is more
appropriate as a basis than the domicile one.66 Where the de-
fendant is without the state, jurisdiction is based not upon
"physical power of control," but upon "allegiance." Although he
is beyond the state to control, his nationality (citizenship) places
a duty upon him to come back into the state or nation to answer
a suit where the jurisdiction is based upon nationality or citizen-
ship. There is no question about the law as to this class of cases,
and there is no question but that nationality should be continued
in certain cases where the state is plaintiff. The only question is
what are the situations that should be included in the classification.
Military cases, some tax cases at least, and perhaps some other
cases where the government is the plaintiff and the duty to re-
spond is based necessarily upon allegiance rather than upon some
other principle, necessitate a retention of the principle of nation-
ality as a basis of jurisdiction. In such cases it serves the purpose
better than domicile.
This leads to the tentative conclusion that there is probably
little need for a retention of domicile as a basis of jurisdiction.
Most, if not all of the domicile cases might well fall into other
recognized and more acceptable categories, for example, presence,
the doing of an act, and nationality. There is no reason why
these bases of jurisdiction would not be as effective to catch "the
elusive defendant" who attempts to flee a suit as well as domicile.
Ehrenzweig and Rabe 67 mention "residence," especially "ha-
O5 See, Restatement, judgments § 16, comment b (1942) for a specific state-
ment of the rule.
16 Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 372 (1962).
a 
7
"[Qluite generally the concepts of domicile and residence tend to coalesce
at least for interstate purposes." Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 372 (1962); 1
Rabel, Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 111-12 (1945), where domicile is
uncertain or diffcult to ascertain.
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bitual residence" as a substitute for domicile as a basis of juris-
diction. Residence has its attractions, particularly as to improve-
ment in the quality of service upon an absent defendant, but it
would be a new basis of jurisdiction, certainly not recognized at
present, and it may be doubted whether recognized bases like
presence, doing of an act, and nationality (citizenship) would
not be as efficient and effective. It is suggested that "residence"
is also a weasel word,68 difficult to put the finger upon, and not
nearly as satisfactory in a number of ways as presence, or the
doing of an act, for example.
If the suggestions in this conclusion were followed, a residuum
of cases based upon domicile would still remain. Some anomalous
situations such as divorce, where jurisdiction is currently definitely
based upon domicile, would survive the suggested changes. Per-
haps, in time, these too might receive a new alignment as a search
for more rational bases of jurisdiction continues.
(3) NATIONAL (CITIZENSHIP)
Nationality (citizenship) may serve as a basis of jurisdiction.
In such cases the "power of control" 69 concept of Holmes as the
fundamental basis of jurisdiction breaks down. Jurisdiction is
based upon "allegiance," which raises a duty to return to answer
the summons to a suit. Such duty arises out of citizenship in the
state or nation, as the case may be. Thus, under our system of
dual citizenship, American citizenship may serve as a basis of
jurisdiction in a federal case and state citizenship may serve the
same purpose in a suit in a state court.
One owes allegiance both to the Nation and to the particular
state, based upon citizenship in each instance. The fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution provides, "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside." However, while one may be a citizen of the United
States and yet domiciled elsewhere, one must be domiciled in a
state of the United States in order to be a citizen of that state.70
68 See Reese and Greene, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 Vand. L. Rev.
561 (1953); note the conclusion at 579-80.69 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916).
70 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 80, comment a (1957). Ap-
parently the requirement of domicile rather than residence is a later development.
Willoughby, in his discussion of state citizenship, speaks of "residence" not
domicile. Willoughby, The Constitution of the United States §§ 128, 130 (1910).
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If one is domiciled outside of the United States, he is not a citi-
zen of any state, although he may be a citizen or national of the
United States.71 It follows then that citizenship does not provide
a state of the United States with a basis of jurisdiction unless
the person is domiciled therein. This is so because the word
"resides" in the fourteenth amendment above has been interpreted
as equivalent to domicile.
Stumberg states the proposition complexly, if not confusingly.
He says, "State citizenship in the United States is the result, not
of allegiance, but of domicile. ' 72 In a sense he has the cart be-
fore the horse. He is correct in that it takes domicile within the
state to create citizenship therein. Then, out of the citizenship
thus created, arises the law-imposed allegiance, which creates the
duty to return to defend a suit filed in the state. Thus, citizen-
ship serves as the basis of jurisdiction in the state suit.
It is, of course, true that one's primary allegiance is to the
Nation in case of conflict between allegiances, but that does not
prevent an allegiance to the state also, based upon the fact that
his person and property and other privileges are under the pro-
tection of the state. In an analogous way the national owes an
allegiance to the Nation, based upon similar protections and priv-
ileges, which the national government provides. Each of these
citizenships furnishes a basis of jurisdiction for suit, state or
national, as the case may be.
This writer is no friend of domicile as a basis of jurisdiction,
as indicated in the preceding discussion 73 and would not use it
as a basis except when it appears unavoidable. Furthermore, he
is most unwilling to base jurisdiction in an action properly based
upon citizenship, national or state, upon anything other than
allegiance. So, he does not want any confusion of words or lan-
guage to give any indication that domicile serves as the basis of
jurisdiction in a state case based upon citizenship. The point is
that while it takes domicile to create state citizenship in a par-
ticular state, it is the citizenship so created that raises the duty,
arising out of allegiance, to respond to the state suit, not domicile.
Turning now to the type of cases that should be included
in the category of decisions based upon citizenship as the basis of
71 Ibid.7 2 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 77 (3d. ed. 1963).
73 Id. at 76 et seq.
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jurisdiction, this writer strongly favors the view of Rosanna Blake
that citizenship as a basis of judicial jurisdiction is proper only
when a state or the Nation in its sovereign capacity has an interest
in the suit.7 4 In other words, it is hard to conceive of a case where
the plaintiff is other than a state or the Nation, where the duty
to return to defend the suit is properly based upon an allegiance
arising, as a matter of law, out of citizenship. To state it dif-
ferently, suits between private persons should never be permitted
in this category. This proposition will be developed as the dis-
cussion progresses.
Probably the clearest instance and the leading case on judicial
jurisdiction based on nationality is Blackmer v. United States.7 5
Blackmer was a citizen of the United States, resident in Paris.
As provided by a statute, he was personally served by the Ameri-
can consul with a subpoena to appear as a witness in a criminal
trial in the District of Columbia. Upon his failure to appear, a
large amount of his property in this country was seized, out of
which was realized a 60,000 dollar fine for contempt. The
United States Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court, said,
"nor can it be doubted that the United States possesses the power
inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this country of
a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest re-
quires it. .... -76
In England, Douglas v. Forrest77 held in 1828, that nationality
is a valid basis of jurisdiction. The absent national owned land
in the jurisdiction and the court based its decision partly on that
fact. The general theory of the case, however, was that a sov-
ereign may require a subject to attend its courts in return for
protection of his person and his property. Subsequent English
cases support the rule by dicta,78 and these English cases involve
suits between private persons.
In addition to Blackmer, several other American courts have
recognized nationality as a basis of judicial jurisdiction,7 9 in the
74 Note, 34 Ky. L.J. 189 (1946).
75284 U.S. 421 (1932).
761d. at 437.
774 Bing. 686, 180 Eng. Rep. 938 (1828).78 Gavin Gibson & Co., Lt. v. Gibson, 3 K.B. 379, 388 (1913); Schibsby v.
Westenholz, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155, 161 (1870).79 Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 A. 715 (1929); Ouseley
v. Lehigh Valley Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 84 Feb. 602 (1897).
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absence of unusual circumstances. On the other hand, in Smith
v. Grady,8° the court refused to recognize a judgment recovered
in a court in Canada against a Canadian residing in Wisconsin,
who was personally served with process in that state. So the cases
based on nationality are not all in accord in this country; Stum-
berg says they are divided.8' Of special interest is Grubel v. Nas-
sauer,2 a case of special circumstances, in which the New York
court refused to enforce a Bavarian judgment against one dom-
iciled in this country and who had no notice of the suit.8 3 In 1933,
two Fort Knox soldiers refused to answer the call of their country,
the Netherlands, to return for military service.84 They had applied
for American citizenship but would not become citizens of the
United States until thirty days after the Netherlands call. This,
of course, was a summons from a national government, not a suit
by a private person. Such proceedings asking for return for mili-
tary service are practically impossible to enforce in the absence
of the granting of extradition by the nation where the foreign
citizen resides.
Turning to the problem on the state level, it is found that
individual states often have statutes placing a duty upon their
citizens to return as witnesses or defendants in criminal proceed-
ings or to appear before legislative committees. For example, a
New York statute similar to that involved in the Blackmer case
authorizes the issuance of an order upon any New York citizen
to appear as a witness before the legislature, any legislative com-
mittee, or any commission appointed by the governor, if his pres-
ence is desired.85 As to suits between private persons on the state
level, several cases have held that a state of the United States has
judicial jurisdiction over its absent citizens. In Matter of Denick 6
it was held that a divorce granted in Michigan, of which both
parties were citizens, was valid, although the defendant was ab-
sent serving a sentence of imprisonment in another state. Simi-
80 68 Wis. 215, 31 N.W. 477 (1887).
81 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 77 (3d ed. 1963).
82210 N.Y. 149, 103 N.E. 1113 (1913).
83Note, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 464 (1914) where emphasis is based upon the
fact of lack of notice.84 Louisville Courier-journal, Oct. 23, 1953, p. 28.
85 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, chi. 643. See also Cheathanm, Goodrich, Griswold and
Reese, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws 104 N.2 (4th ed. 1951).86 836 N.Y.S. 518 (1895).
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larly, in Hamill v. Talbott7 it was found that since the defendant
was a citizen of Ohio, an Ohio court had jurisdiction to render a
decree of divorce. In each of these cases the defendant was dom-
iciled in the state and while that was made clear in the decisions,
the courts stressed citizenship in the state in each instance as
affording jurisdiction, for what that is worth, since these were di-
vorce cases, and such a basis of jurisdiction is now dated, current
jurisdiction for divorce now rests on domicile alone. In a third
case, Henderson v. Stanford,88 the defendant, in a suit on a prom-
issory note, was a citizen of and domiciled in California. Massa-
chusetts gave full faith and credit to the judgment arising out
of that action.
In conclusion, it is astonishing that most of the cases wherein
jurisdiction is based upon citizenship or nationality, state or
national, involve suits or proceedings between private persons.
To state it differently, the cases in which jurisdiction is based upon
nationality or citizenship do not get into a discussion of a divi-
sion based upon whether the plaintiff in the case is the sovereign
or a private person.
This probably accounts for the uncertainty in the United
States, pointed out by Stumberg,8 9 as to nationality or citizenship
as a basis of jurisdiction. All the cases taking a negative position on
the matter are suits between private persons. There seems to be
no doubt on the matter where the suit or proceeding is brought
in the interest of the sovereign. These negative cases fortify the
writer's position that suits between private persons should not be
based upon this jurisdictional factor. Of course, it may well be
argued that a court is the creature of the state or nation and if it
entertains a suit brought by a private person against another
private person, who is a citizen, the power to force the absent
defendant to return to defend is inherent in the court. The
matter may be thus rationalized. The question is whether it is
wise to base jurisdiction on "allegiance" in the case of private
suits rather than upon more acceptable and rational bases, such
as presence, the doing of an act within the jurisdiction, or even
domicile.
8772 Mo. App. 22 (1897).
88 105 Mass. 504 (1870).89 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 77 (3d ed. 1963).
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(4.) APPEARANcE
Both StumbergO0 and Goodrich 9' treat appearance under the
head of consent. It is true that when a defendant makes a general
appearance he consents to the jurisdiction of the court. It is sug-
gested, however, follwing the thinking of Rosanna Blake,92 that
presence rather than consent is a better rationalization for appear-
ance as a basis of jurisdiction. The rule that appearance confers
jurisdiction subjects the plaintiff, who brings suit, and thus
appears, to an adjudication of the claim in its entirety, including
a counterclaim, or set-off. As Chief Justice Stone said in Adam v.
Saenger,9 3 "The plaintiff having by his voluntary act in demand-
ing justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in
treating him as being there for all purposes for which justice to the
defendant requires his presence. ' 94
The most interesting problem in the cases in the appearance
category involves the special appearance to question jurisdiction.
It is obvious that this is not a consent to appearance for jurisdic-
tional purposes; in fact, it is quite the contrary. Yet a state by
statute may provide that a special appearance for the sole purpose
of testing jurisdiction may subject the one who appears to all the
consequences of a general appearance. The special appearance
becomes a general appearance by operation of law.
This, it is submitted, is erroneous. Almost all states permit
the defendant to make a "special appearance" by which he can
raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction of his person without
suffering a determination of the case on its merits.95 What could
be more logical, technically and practically? A court without
jurisdiction has no authority or power to render a valid judgment.
The matter of jurisdiction then should be permitted to be de-
termined specifically without trying the case on its merits and
later attempting to reach the problem by trying to find a way
to keep the invalid judgment from being enforced. To turn a
DO Id. at 80.
91 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 197 (3d ed. 1949).92 Note, 33 Ky. L.J. 126, 128 (1945).
93303 U.S. 59 (1938).
94 Id. at 67.
95 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 11T, comment a (1957).
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special appearance for that purpose into a general appearance by
"hocus pocus" is preposterous.
The leading case on special appearance to test jurisdiction is
York v. Texas.96 That case held that a statute making a special
appearance a general appearance does not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution because a judgment does not deprive a
person of his property; it is only on execution that property is
taken. Although there is a certain amount of technical truth in
this, it is suggested that a judgment in itself presupposes that
property may be taken to satisfy it. What could the defendant do
to prevent execution on the judgment? Ask for an injunction?
Would the court that took jurisdiction under such circumstances
and rendered the judgment grant the injunction? Certainly not.97
The reasoning of the Court is not persuasive.
The Restatement agrees that a statute may turn a special ap-
pearance into a general appearance but states that Texas is perhaps
the only state to exercise such constitutional prerogative. 9
Beale says that at common law it is settled that a court has no
jurisdiction over the defendant's person under such a procedure,
but that a statute may make such an appearance a general one and
that a judgment under such circumstances is valid and entitled
to full faith and credit.99 It is believed that such a statute should
be unconstitutional under fundamental principles of jurisdiction,
that one should be able to test specially the jurisdiction of the
court to entertain the action and that it is unfortunate that Texas
has such a rule.100 But it is more unfortunate that the Supreme
Court has held that it is constitutional.
(5.) CONSENT
A prelitigation contract to submit to the jurisdiction of a par-
ticular court is generally regarded as a sufficient basis of juris-
diction when such jurisdiction is reasonable and convenient for
the parties. It is always relevant to ask why the place of such
96137 U.S. 15 (1890).97 Note, 33 Ky. L.J. 126, 128 (1945).98 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 117b, comment d (1957).
993 Beale, Treatise on Conflict of Laws 82.7 (1935).
100 But see, Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 81, n. 60 (3d ed. 1963),
citing rule 120(a), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a proposed rule subject to
legislative approval, permitting, to a limited extent, special appearance to test
jurisdiction.
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jurisdiction was chosen. Did one of the parties suggest it because
it would be more advantageous to him than other and perhaps
more normal bases of jurisdiction? Does the jurisdiction to which
the other party has consented give the party who suggested it an
unfair advantage?1 1 Such questions are pertinent to the issue of
whether jurisdiction by consent will be accepted by the court
in the particular case.1°2
Gilbert v. Burnstine0 3 and Copin v. Adamson'0 4 are helpful
in discussing these questions. In Gilbert v. Burnstine the de-
fendants were residents and citizens of New York. They contracted
with the plaintiff for the sale and delivery in the United States
of zinc concentrates. By a clause in the contract the parties con-
tracted in writing that all differences arising thereunder should
be arbitrated in London. Differences arose over the alleged fail-
ure of the defendant to deliver in accordance with the terms
of the agreement. Notice was served on the defendant in New
York but he did not appear in London to arbitrate and the
arbitrator rendered an award against him. The New York Court
held that consent to English jurisdiction was implied from the
contract to arbitrate in London and the award was valid. By
subsequent New York cases, however, it is uncertain whether
consent to jurisdiction will be implied from consent to arbitrate0
In the Co pin case the defendant was a British subject who
became a stockholder in a French corporation whose articles of
incorporation provided that all disputes arising during liquida-
tion should be submitted to a tribunal in the department of the
Seine; that every shareholder must elect a domicile in Paris; and
that in the absence of such an election he should be deemed
domiciled at the office of the official procurator for service of
process. It was held that if the defendant did not elect a domicile
one could be selected for him under the agreement and that
notice of intent of this could be implied from purchase of the
shares. However, it was held that service on the French pro-
curator, without knowledge on the defendant's part, was not a
valid notice of the suit. The only question would seem to be
l'0 Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 944 (1960).
102 Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 606
(2d Cir. 1955).
103255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
104L. R. 9 Exch. 345 (1874).
105 Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 944 n.219 (1960).
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whether mere purchase of the stock should bind him on a pro-
vision in the articles of incorporation that such purchase should
give consent to Paris domicile. Was such implied consent fair
under the circumstances? It is submitted that it was not.
These cases may also serve to introduce the question whether
the parties can consent to a jurisdiction which would not have
been applicable under normal circumstances and fundamental
principles. To this question it can be said definitely that the parties
cannot by consent confer jurisdiction over the subject matter,
if the court would not have had such jurisdiction without such
consent. 0 6 An instance in which the courts have failed to apply
this rule, however, may be found in the cases involving res adjudi-
cata in divorce actions, where the courts have held in a number
of cases that where the defendant appeared personally the court
had jurisdiction to grant the divorce, although it is clear from
the facts that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter. Such a case (and there are others) is Sherrer v. Sherrer,1oT
where, in a divorce action there was jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant by appearance but no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the divorce, since the plaintiff on the record failed to
satisfy the ninety-day residence requirement. The decisions on
res judicata in divorce actions are a "black page" in Conflict of
Laws law.
Jurisdiction by consent over the person is a much more flexible
matter. Naturally, objections such as that the forum chosen by
the parties is an inconvenient one, or places an unfair burden
on the court system and taxpayers of a jurisdiction which has no
connection with the suit, or that the place chosen by the parties
is one not normally acceptable under fundamental principles of
jurisdiction, are issues that may have to be met and determined
by the judge in deciding whether the place chosen by the parties
will be accepted by the court when suit is brought there. How-
ever, there is often a decided advantage in allowing the parties
to select the jurisdiction for a trial of the case, if the place is
reasonable under the circumstances and neither party gains an
advantage because of the consent. Sometimes there are several
10 6 Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 F.2d 6 (1952). Note, 34 Ky.
L.J. 139, 141 (1946).
107334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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places where the case might be tried. It is advantageous if the
parties, in advance, can determine the situs by consnt. Whether
they will be permitted to do so depends upon balancing these
various factors and a judicial determination by the court after
they are weighed against each other.
Grubel v. NassauerloS and Gilbert v. Burnstein,10 9 will serve
to illustrate the advantage of permitting the parties to select in
advance, by consent, the jurisdiction where the trial shall be
held if a suit between the contracting parties should arise. In
the Grubel case the defendant was a subject of Germany. He
came to New York where he filed notice of his intention to become
a citizen of the United States. Subsequently the plaintiff, a sub-
ject of Germany filed suit in Germany on an obligation alleged
to have occurred before the defendant's departure from that
country. Service was by publication and judgment by default was
rendered. The New York court refused to enforce the judgment.
The case is easy, in view of the inadequacy of service by publica-
tion. But if the defendant had received notice, would it follow that
the German judgment would then have been enforced in this
country? It is problematical.
In a complex situation such as the one in the Grubel case, it is
very advantageous if the parties themselves weigh the conflicting
jurisdictional possibilities and determine by consent in advance
where a suit, if one should be brought, would be filed. In the
Grubel case should Germany have had jurisdiction? Should suit
have been brought in New York? There is support for either
location. It is best if the parties themselves can decide the matter.
Gilbert v. Burnstein"° shows how such a problem can be
handled by consent to jurisdiction in advance. In that case there
was a contract for delivery of zinc concentrates between the de-
fendants, residents and citizens of New York, and plaintiff, with
an agreement that any controversy should be referred to an arbi-
trator in London. The court held that London had jurisdiction
by implied consent. The case has its difficulties but serves to
make the point that the parties, in a situation where either New
York or London might have jurisdiction, can determine for them-
108210 N.Y. 149, 103 N.E. 1113 (1913).
100255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
110 Ibid.
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selves in advance which place it is to be. This may not work out
successfully in a particular case, but consent jurisdiction will
often be the best way to fix jurisdiction where there are several
possible choices.
There remains to be discussed one of the most interesting
and frustrating situations in jurisdiction by consent. Frequently,
stipulations in a promisory note authorize an attorney or justice
of the peace to enter or confess judgment against the maker upon
default of payment. When such an agreement is made in a state
where it is valid, it has been held that such judgment is entitled
to full faith and credit elsewhere.11' This is the cognovit note.
The question is, why would the maker of a note be so foolish
as to execute such an instrument? There must be some good
reason or expediency for such consent but this writer has never
been able to justify it.
The leading case is Egley v. Bennett & Co." 2 The plaintiff,
a corporation, having its principal office in Illinois, recovered a
judgment against the maker on a note executed in Indiana but
made payable in Illinois. The note contained a provision giving
a warrant of attorney for the confession of judgment, waiving all
process. In fact, no process was issued, but an attorney confessed
judgment. This would not have been valid under the law of
Indiana (some states do not allow the procedure), but was valid
under the law of Illinois. The Indiana Court in a suit upon the
judgment held that the warrant of attorney to confess judgment
was a matter connected with the performance of the contract and
not with its validity, and since the confession of judgment was
valid where made, the judgment was valid and entitled to full
faith and credit. This, of course, is a type of consent in advance.
This writer has no particular objection to holding that tech-
nically this is a matter of performance. It can be argued just as
persuasively that it is technically a matter of essential validity
of the note; therefore a different result would be altogether pos-
sible in the Egley case, technically, since under the law of Indiana
such a provision was invalid and matters of essential validity are
decided according to the law of the place where the instrument
was "made." But since this writer objects to the cognovit note
"'1 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 79 (3d ed. 1963).
112 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924).
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strongly as a matter of policy, he prefers to disagree with the
case and hang the decision upon the ground that this (all things
considered) is best taken as a matter of essential validity and the
Egley case is not the better result. The decisions are in conflict.113
The best way to handle the problem, it is submitted is to take a
direct approach and hold consent to confess judgment on a note
invalid, as a matter of policy. This is what many states do.
Ed. Note: The third installment of this article will appear in Vol. 55 of the
Kentucky Law Journal.
113 Note, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 908 (1925).
